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Abstract
We theoretically explore the risk-taking behavior of two unequally-endowed risk-neutral agents who 
are presented with opportunities to play lotteries.  We fi nd that if the agents consider rank in the wealth 
distribution more important than wealth itself, then their risk preferences are distorted in a way that 
lowers their expected income, raises inequality and increases wealth-rank mobility.  In equilibrium, the 
rich agent avoids some positive expected return lotteries and both agents gamble on some negative 
expected return lotteries.  We simulate and graph equilibrium strategies to visualize how trying to get 
richer differs from trying to be richer than someone else.
Keywords: wealth rank, risk-taking, gambling, positional competition, relative income
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We study risk-taking behavior by two risk-neutral agents each of whom cares primarily about his rank 
in the wealth distribution and secondarily about how much wealth he has.   In a previous study of the 
problem, we examined the intricate ways in which the pursuit of wealth rank distorts risk preferences, 
inducing agents to gamble on some negative expected return lotteries and to avoid some positive 
expected return investments.  (Rtischev 2008)    The model in that study, however, allowed the rich agent 
to take bigger risks than the poor agent, and the fi ndings were thus contingent on such an inequality of 
opportunity.  In this paper, we re-examine the problem in a different framework that gives both agents 
the same set of opportunities and also allows visualization of strategies. 
Our investigation belongs to the strand of research on the connection between willingness to take risks 
and concern for relative position.  Broadly speaking, we fi nd that the poor takes on more risk while the 
rich plays it safe.  This is generally consistent with prior theoretical results (Gregory 1980; Robson 1992, 
1996; Stark 2019) as well as experimental evidence (Mishra, Barclay and Lalumière, 2014).  Using a 
new modeling approach, we are able to depict the agents? risk strategies as regions in two-dimensional 
space and inspect in detail how the pursuit of rank shapes their risk strategies.  This allows us to visually 
demonstrate that trying to get richer is very different from trying to be richer than someone else.  It als o 
reveals that, despite the overall tendency of the poor to gamble and the rich to play it safe, even the rich 
are prone to play some negative expected return lotteries as part of a strategy to defend high rank. 
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Moreover, we fi nd that, relative to pursuit of wealth, pursuit of wealth-rank lowers expected income, 
raises inequality and increases wealth-rank mobility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents the model and Section 3 
analyzes it in general.   Section 4 derives strategies and outcomes in several baseline cases.  Section 5 
presents equilibrium analysis based on computer simulations.   Section 6 concludes.
?????????????
There are two players: Abe endowed with a>0 and Bob endowed with b>0 dollars.  Abe is richer: 
d
 ? a – b > 0.   A lottery ticket is offered to Bob:  the ticket costs y < b dollars, the winning prize is x + 
y
 dollars, and the probability of winning is 1/2.  Thus, if Bob decides to buy the ticket, his wealth will 
either increase to b + x or decrease to b – y.  Simultaneously, another lottery ticket is offered to Abe: the 
price and prize are potentially different, but the probability of winning is also 1/2.  
Abe and Bob don?t see each other?s lottery tickets but know that they are independent identically 
distributed draws from the uniform distribution of equiprobable binary lotteries with support on ?
={(x,y)|x,y? (0,M?}, where 0 < d < M < b.   Each agent must decide whether to buy the ticket he has 
been offered without any knowledge of the other?s ticket or decision.
Alternatively, the game can be formulated in discrete space, as follows.  Each player draws 2 balls 
(with replacement) from an urn containing M balls numbered from 1 to M.  The fi rst ball signifi es the 
price of the lottery ticket y and the second ball signifi es the possible net gain x.  Below, we will use the 
continuous formulation for analysis and the discrete formulation for computer simulations.
Only one lottery is offered to each player and each must decide whether to play it or abstain.  Each 
player?s primary objective is to maximize the probability of becoming the richer player.  Maximizing 
expected income is a secondary objective that each player considers only when the primary objective 
leaves him indifferent.   Formally, if after the lottery Abe ends up with mA dollars and Bob with mB, then 
Abe?s utility is 
u(mA) =
mA + V if mA ≥ mB
mA       if mA <  mB???????????????(1)
and Bob?s utility is 
u(mB) =
mB + V if mB >  mA
mB       if mB ≤ mA ???????????????(2)
where V>>a+M is a big prize that brings more utility than money can buy.
?????????????
The game is essentially a winner-take-all tournament.  Let mi be the random variable representing the 
wealth of player i? {A,B} after the game.  Denote the ex ante probability of Abe winning the 
tournament by ? ? Pr(mA ≥ mB). Let Si?? be the strategy of agent i, i.e., the set of lotteries he would 
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play if offered.  Any strategy profi le {SA, SB} corresponds to an allocation of contest success probability 
(CSP) between the two players on the simplex {(? ,1?? ) ? ?? [0,1] }.
Let Fi(m) ? Pr(mi < m|Si) be the cumulative distribution function of the post-game wealth of player i 
if he plays strategy Si.  Denote the corresponding probability density function by fi(m)= dFi(m)/dm.
Each player?s optimal decision whether to play or pass on a given lottery depends on the distribution 
of the other player?s ex post wealth given the other player?s strategy.  Suppose Abe is considering whether 
to play a particular lottery (x, y) given that Bob is playing strategy SB which results in an ex post 
distribution of wealth FB(m).  If Abe passes on the lottery, the probability of him remaining the richer 
man is Pr(mB≥a) = FB(a).  If he plays the lottery, the probability of him remaining the richer man is
1
2
1
2
FB(a?x) + ???FB(a?y)???????????????(3)
The critical threshold for Abe to play the lottery is thus 
1
2
1
2
TA(x,y) ??FB(a?x) + ???FB(a?y) - FB(a)????????????(4)
If the threshold is positive, Abe plays the lottery.  If it is negative, he abstains. If it is zero, he plays only 
if the lottery offers a positive expected return.  We can thus express Abe?s best response strategy as
SA
BR(SB) ??(x,y)???TA(x,y) >  0  or (TA(x,y)?0  and x >  y))?????????(5)
Bob?s best response can be expressed analogously. 
Lemma 1.  If a strategy Si is a best response to some strategy of the opponent, i.e., Si=Si
BR(Sj?), then for 
all (x,y),(x',y')?? the following hold
(i)  Every lottery offering a higher expected return than a lottery in the best response must also be part 
of the best response:
(x,y)? Si? ?(x´,y´)? Si? x´ ? x ?y´ ??y
(ii)  Every lottery offering a lower expected return than a lottery absent from the best response must 
also be absent from the best response
(x,y)? Si? ?(x´,y´)? Si? x´ ? x ?y´ ??y
(iii)  Let si(x)? sup{y | (x,y)? Si} be the biggest loss that player i is willing to risk on a lottery in the 
hope of winning x.  The function si(x) is non-decreasing on (0, M) and traces the upper-left 
boundary (frontier) of Si.
Proof.
(i) If x'≥x and y'≤y, then Ti (x',y')≥Ti (x,y).  Since (x,y) is in the best response set of strategies, Ti(x,y) > 
0
 and therefore Ti(x',y') > 0.
(ii) If x'≤x and y'≥y, then Ti (x',y' )≤Ti (x,y).  Since (x,y) is not in the best response set of strategies, 
Ti(x,y) < 0 and therefore Ti(x',y') < 0.
(iii) Follows from (i) and (ii). QED
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As shown in Figure 1, contest success probability can be computed by integrating probability density 
over the part of the 2M by 2M square event space that lies above the 45° line.  Specifi cally,
π = 1 ? fA(mA)
b?M
a?M
fB(mB)dmBdmA
b?M
mA ???????????????(6)
which simplifies to
π = 1 ? FA(b?M)? fA(mA) FB(mA)dmA
b?M
a?M ???????????????(7)
??????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
By Lemma 1, best response strategies can be expressed in terms of boundary curves sA(x) and sB(x). 
Using these strategy curves and with reference to Figure 2, we can express Abe?s cumulative distribution 
Pr(mA<m) by 
FA(m) =
FA
lose(m), m < a
FA
win
 (m), m ≥ a???????????????(8)
where
1
2M 2 (a?m)SA−1FA
lose
 (m) = (sA  (x)?(a?m))dx
M
???????????????(9)
1
2M 2
FA
win
 (m) = KA  ?
m−a
sA  (x)dx0   ??????????????(10)
and where the probability of Abe abstaining is given by
1
M 2
M
sA  (x)dx0KA   = 1?   ??????????????(11)
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(i)  z<a (lottery loss)?????????(ii)  z>a (lottery win)???
??????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????
Differentiating ?8? gives Abe?s probability density function:
fA  (m) = gA  (m)?KA δ (m?a)  ??????????????(12)
where ? is the Dirac delta function and 
gA  (m) =
gA
lose
 (m) , m <  a
gA
win
 (m) , m >  a   ??????????????(13)
where
gA
lose(m) = M?????
2M2
(a m)SA−1
  ??????????????(14)
gA
win(m) =
2M2
(m?a)SA
  ??????????????(15)
Bob?s cumulative distribution and probability density functions can be expressed analogously. 
Using these expressions for the distributions and densities, we can rewrite the contest success 
probability (7) as follows:
π = 1 ? FA
win(b?M)?KAFBwin(a)? gA(mA) FB(mA)dmA
b?M
a?M
  ??????????????(16)
Since a – M < b < a < b+M, we can rewrite (16) to make explicit the various combinations of wins and 
losses by the two players:
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π = 1 ? FA
win(b?M)?KAFBwin(a)
? gA
lose(mA) FBlose(mA)dmA
b
a?M
? gA
lose(mA) FBwin(mA)dmA
a
b
? gA
win(mA) FBwin(mA)dmA
b?M
a
  ??????????????(17)
Expression (17) links players? strategies to contest success probabilities.  The problem of fi nding best 
responses and equilibrium corresponds to maximizing (17) over the set of all possible strategy curves 
sA(x) and sB(x).  Since it is diffi cult to solve this in general, we will examine various special cases and 
then use simulation to study the equilibrium.
????????????????????????????????????????????
We fi rst examine three baseline cases in which both players are hard-wired to play the same strategy.
1. Si =Ø : both players abstain from all lotteries.  The allocation of CSP is ? =1.
2.  Si =? : both players willing to play all lotteries.  The probability density of mA is uniformly 
distributed on [a-M, a+M] and the cumulative distribution of mA increases linearly from 0 to 1 on 
the same interval.  The density and distribution of mB are analogous.  The allocation of CSP is 
(2M?d )2
8M 2π = 1 ?   ??????????????(18)
?? By symmetry of the lottery space, the expected gain from every positive-expected return lottery is 
offset by the expected loss from a corresponding negative-expected return lottery.  Therefore, 
expected income is zero.
3.  Si =?? {(x,y)?? | x>y} : both players maximize income by playing all lotteries with positive 
expected return and abstaining from all negative expected return gambles.  The probability density 
and cumulative distribution functions for Abe are given by the following expressions (see Figure 3):
m?M?a
2M 2
gA
lose
 (m) =??????, m ? [a?M,a)
  ??????????????(19)
gA
win
 (m) =????, m ? (a, a?M]m?a
2M 2   ??????????????(20)
(m?M?a ) 2
4M 2
FA
lose
 (m) =??????, m ? [a?M, a)
  ??????????????(21)
(m?a ) 2
4M 2
3
4FA
win
 (m) =????????, m ? [a, a?M ]
  ??????????????(22)
??Bob?s expressions are analogous, with b replacing a.  The allocation of CSP is
5
8π  =???????
5d
12M
d 2(6M?d )(2M?d )
96M 4   ??????????????(23)
A Study of How Pursuit of Wealth Rank Distorts Risk Preferences
161
?Players? expected incomes are E[IA] = E[IB] = 
M
12  , where?E[IA] ? E[mA]?a?and?E[IB] ? E[mB]?b .
??????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
We next examine best-response strategies in six baseline cases.
4.  SB=?Ø : If Bob abstains from all lotteries, Abe?s best response is to buy all positive expected return 
lotteries except those whose price is so large as to jeopardize his initial wealth advantage (Figure 4a 
left):
SA
BR(Ø) ??(x,y)????y <  min(d , x)?
? Abe?s expected income is?E[IA] =
(d 2?3dM?3M 2)d
2M 2
?, which is less than M/12 that he could have 
earned if he didn?t care about being leapfrogged and simply played all the positive expected return 
lotteries.  By foregoing some expected income, Abe manages to keep CSP at ??1 , retaining his 
top rank for sure.
5.  SA= Ø : If Abe abstains from all lotteries, Bob?s best response is to buy all lotteries with prize large 
enough to leapfrog Abe, and also positive-expected return lotteries with a smaller prize (Figure 4a 
right):
SB
BR(Ø) ??(x,y)????x >  min(d , y)?
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? Bob?s expected income is E[IB] =
(d 2?3dM?3M 2)d
2M 2
 , which is less than M/12 that he could have 
earned if he didn?t try to leapfrog Abe and simply played all the positive expected return lotteries. 
By foregoing some expected income, Bob manages to lower Abe?s chances of retaining top wealth 
rank to ? 12
d
2Mπ =???+ ?.
6. SB=? : If Bob buys all lotteries, Abe?s best response is (Figure 4b left):
SA
BR(?) ??(x,y)????y <  min(M?d , x)? 
? Abe?s expected income is E[IA] =
M 3?d 3
12M 2
?, which is less than M/12 that he could have earned if he 
didn?t care about staying ahead of Bob and just tried to maximize income.
7. SA=? :  If Abe buys all lotteries, Bob?s best response is (Figure 4b right):
SB
BR(?) ??(x,y)????x >  min(M?d , y)? 
? Bob?s expected income is E[IB] =
M 3?d 3
12M 2
?, which is less than M/12 that he could have earned if he 
didn?t care about getting ahead of Abe and just tried to maximize income.
8. SB=? :  If Bob maximizes income, Abe?s best response is
SA
BR(?) ??(x,y)????y <  d and (x?d )2?(y?d )2 >2d 2? 
? This can be derived by substituting Bob?s version of (21) and (22) into (4) and solving TA(x,y)=0. 
As Figure 4c (left) shows, in response to an absolute wealth maximizer, a richer player who wants 
to keep his rank abstains from some positive expected return investments that may lead to a big loss 
but is willing to gamble on some small negative expected return lotteries.
9. SA=? : If Abe maximizes income, Bob?s best response is
SB
BR(?) ??(x,y)????x >  d or (x?M?d )2?(y?(M?d ))2 > 2 (M?d )2? 
? This can be derived by substituting (21) and (22) into Bob?s version of (4) and solving TB(x,y)=0. 
As Figure 4c (right) shows, in response to an absolute wealth maximizer, a poorer player who wants 
to leapfrog plays all positive expected return lotteries and many but not all of the negative expected 
return ones. 
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SA
BR(Ø)??????????????SBBR(Ø)???
???????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????
SA
BR(? )??????????????SBBR(? )???
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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??SA
BR(? )???????????????????SBBR(? )
???????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
???????????????
Nash equilibrium is a strategy profi le ?SA
NE
, SB
NE ? such that?SA
NE? SA
BR(SBNE)? and?SBNE? SBBR(SANE) .  We 
implemented the following simulation algorithm to fi nd equilibrium strategies:
1?Initialize both players? strategies to absolute wealth maximization: Si =? 
2?Compute players? probability distributions of post-lottery wealth fi(m)
3? Re-compute Abe?s best response strategy, i.e., the strategy that maximizes the probability that mA ≥ 
mB given fB(m)
4?Re-compute the probability distribution of post-lottery wealth for Abe:  fA(m)
5? Re-compute Bob?s best response strategy, i.e., the strategy that maximizes the probability that mB > 
mA given fA(m)
6?Re-compute the probability distribution of post-lottery wealth for Bob:  fB(m)
7? Repeat 3-5 until both players? strategies stop changing or the maximum number of iterations has 
been reached
We programmed the algorithm in Ruby and ran the simulation with various sets of parameters.  For all 
parameters and initial strategies that we tried, the algorithm quickly converged to an equilibrium.2?   We 
?? For some parameter combinations, the algorithm converged to a cycle between two strategies.  Since scaling the pa-
rameters proportionally eliminated such cycling, it appears that the cycling is an artifact of the discretization of strate-
gy space.
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will describe the results of a simulation with the following parameters: a=169, b=140, M=120.  This 
simulation reached equilibrium in 13 iterations.  The equilibrium strategies are shown in Figure 5 and 
closely resemble equilibria reached in other simulation runs using different parameter values.  Note that 
in equilibrium both rich and poor agents play some negative expected return lotteries and that the rich 
agent but not the poor avoids some positive expected return lotteries.  Figure 6 shows the equilibrium 
distributions of the players? post-game wealth.   Overall, the poor agent takes on much more negative 
expected return risk than the rich agent.  However, the poor agent is also more willing to make positive-
expected return investments than the rich; in fact, unlike the rich, the poor agent does not abstain from 
any positive expected return lottery.
In this simulation, when both players maximize income, the probability that the rich stays rich is ? = 
0.72.  Playing the game according to equilibrium strategies reallocates some CSP to the poor player. 
Specifi cally, in equilibrium ? = 0.65, which means strategizing for rank raises the poor player?s 
probability of leapfrogging from 0.28 to 0.35, a gain of 25%.
Although playing the game according to equilibrium strategies increases wealth rank mobility, it 
reduces the expected income of both agents.  Specifi cally, when using income maximization strategies, 
each agent?s expected income is 10.  However, when playing rank-seeking equilibrium strategies, the rich 
and poor agent?s expected incomes drop to 9.3 and 4.5, respectively.  Thus, by pursuing wealth rank 
instead of wealth, the rich player sacrifi ces expected income by 7% and the poor player by 55%.
In the simulation, the pursuit of rank in the wealth distribution leads to greater wealth inequality.  As 
Table 1 shows, the difference in initial endowments is 9.4% of total wealth.  If the agents maximize 
income, the difference in their expected wealth comes down to 8.8% of the total expected ex-post wealth. 
However, if they pursue wealth rank, it rises to 10.5%.  Thus, pursuing income reduces inequality but 
pursuing wealth rank increases it.
It is interesting to compare this equilibrium to best-responses against an income-maximizing opponent 
that we considered in general in Section 4, Cases 8-9 and Figure 4c.  Figure 7 shows the simulated best-
response strategies to an income-maximizing opponent for the same parameter values as the equilibrium 
???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ?????????? ??????????? ???????
???????????????? ?? ? ??? ???
???????????? ??????? ?? ????? ?????? ?????
???????????? ??????? ?? ????? ?????? ??????
???????????? ????? ?????? ?????? ???????? ?????
???????????? ????? ?????? ?????? ???????? ?????
?????????? ? ??????????? ????? ????? ??????? ?????
???????????? ? ?????? ?????? ???????? ?????
???????????????? ? ?? ??????? ??????? ??????? ?????
????????? ? ??????? ??????? ??????? ?????
????????? ?? ? ??????? ??????? ??????? ?????
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simulation; Figure 8 shows the corresponding distributions of ex-post wealth.   Figure 9 shows the 
difference between the equilibrium strategies and the best-responses to income maximization.  As Figure 
9a reveals, Abe plays many more positive expected return lotteries in equilibrium than when best-
responding to an income-maximizing Bob.  However, as Figure 9b reveals, Bob plays many more 
negative expected return lotteries in equilibrium than when best-responding to an income-maximizing 
Abe.   Although the shapes of the equilibrium strategies resemble the best-response strategies to an 
income-maximizing opponent, in equilibrium both agents play more lotteries, take on more risk, and 
generate more variance in ex-post wealth.
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???????????? ????? ???????????? ?????????? ? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ?????????????????????????
???????? ???? ??????? ????? ????????????????????????? ????????????? ? ??????????
???????? ??????? ?????????????? ???????????????? ????? ??? ?? ???????????????????
???????? ????????? ???? ???? ????????? ????? ??? ?? ??????? ????? ????? ??????? ???? ??????????
?????????? ?????? ???????? ???? ????????? ????? ?????? ????????? ??????????? ?????????
???????
???????????? ????? ???????????? ?????????? ? ???? ????? ???? ?????? ???? ?????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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??????????? ??????????? ???????? ???? ??????????? ????????????? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ???????
?????????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ??????????? ??? ??????? ??? ? ???? ?????? ????? ???
?????????? ??????? ?????? ???? ?????? ??????????? ???????????? ??? ??????????? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
fA(mA) fB(mB)
FA(mA) FB(mB)
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?????? ??? ??????? ??? ? ???? ?????? ????? ??? ?????????? ??????? ?????? ???? ??????
??????????? ???????????? ??? ??????????? ????? ?????????? ?????? ???? ?????? ??? ????????
??????????????????????????????????????
fA(mA) fB(mB)
FA(mA) FB(mB)
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?????????????
We used a simple setting to explore how trying to get richer differs from trying to be richer than 
someone else.  Specifi cally, we examined the risk-taking behavior of two unequally endowed risk-neutral 
agents who are presented with identical opportunities to play binary lotteries.  We found that if the agents 
pursue rank in the wealth distribution as a primary objective and wealth as a secondary objective, their 
risk-taking behavior is distorted (relative to wealth-seeking) in a way that lowers their expected income 
and raises both inequality and wealth-rank mobility.  In equilibrium, the poor agent is willing to bet on 
all positive expected return lotteries and on many of the negative expected return lotteries as well; the 
rich agent abstains from many positive expected return lotteries but is willing to gamble on a small 
number of negative expected return lotteries.  It remains an open problem to generalize the analysis to 
many players and derive analytical expressions for the equilibrium strategies.  
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